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INTRODUCTION
Most of Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution sets forth mundane
presidential responsibilities or powers. Section 3 prescribes the President’s duty
“from time to time” to report to Congress on “the State of the Union” and to
recommend to that body “such Measures as he shall judge necessary and
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expedient.”1 It also gives the President discretion to call an adjourned Congress
back into session and, when the Houses cannot agree about adjournment, to
“adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper.”2 And while one must go to
the Appointments Clause in Section 2 in order to find the power actually to
appoint “Officers of the United States,”3 Section 3 makes clear that it is the
President who must sign their commissions.4 That latter section also prescribes
the presidential duty to “receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers,” which
Hamilton described as a ministerial duty largely “without consequence.”5
Nestled amidst this set of largely technical provisions is one that has
become an “elephant[] in [a] mousehole”6—the Take Care Clause.7 In simple
but delphic terms, the clause states that the President “shall take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed.”8 Today, at least, no one can really know why
the Framers included such language or placed it where they did.9 Phrased in
a passive voice, the clause seems to impose upon the President some sort of
duty to exercise unspecified means to get those who execute the law, whoever
they may be, to act with some sort of fidelity that the clause does not define.10
Through a long and varied course of interpretation, however, the Court has
read that vague but modest language, in the alternative, either as a source of
vast presidential power or as a sharp limitation on the powers of both the
President and the other branches of government.
Consider the following examples: First, and perhaps most prominently, the
Court has relied on the President’s duty to “take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed” to establish the power to remove officers who do not follow
1
2
3
4
5

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
Id.
Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
Id. art. II, § 3.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, at 420 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). In
contrast with that assessment, the Court in Zivotofsky v. Kerry relied on this clause in part to conclude
that the President had the power to recognize foreign nations. 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2085 (2015).
6 We borrow the Court’s apt phrase for the presumption that a lawmaking body does not usually
alter fundamental features of a legal regime through “vague terms or ancillary provisions—it does not, one
might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.” Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001).
7 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
8 Id.
9 It is possible, as others have done, to identify where in the drafting process the clause came
into the document. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the
Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 64-68 (1994) (noting the clause’s emergence in the Committee
on Style and tracing the evolution of similar language which preceded it). But those in the
constitutionmaking process said next to nothing about either the clause’s understood meaning or the
purpose it was to serve in the constitutional scheme. See id. at 63 (“[A]t the founding, the clause
received relatively little consideration by practically everyone in the debate. Hamilton devoted only
a few lines in the Federalist Papers to discussion of this ‘minor’ executive power or responsibility.”).
10 See Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124 YALE L.J. 1836, 1875-78 (2015)
(noting that the clause’s use of passive voice necessarily contemplates law administration by someone
other than the President).
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the President’s directives.11 Second, the Court has used the Take Care Clause
to define the limits of Article III standing, holding that the constitutional
requirements of injury, causation, and redressability help to ensure that the
President rather than the federal judiciary retains primary responsibility for the
legality of executive decisions.12 Third, the Court has treated the Take Care
Clause as the source of the President’s prosecutorial discretion13—a power that,
as recent events have shown us, may give the President room to reshape the
effective reach of laws enacted by Congress.14 Fourth, the Court has treated the
Take Care Clause as the direct constitutional source of the President’s
obligation to respect legislative supremacy.15 Indeed, the Court has read the
clause as a negation of any presidential power to dispense with or suspend
federal law.16 Fifth, in at least one high profile case, the Court has read the Take
Care Clause as the source of inherent presidential authority to take acts

11 See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 484 (2010)
(“The President cannot ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed’ if he cannot oversee the
faithfulness of the officers who execute them.”); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 117 (1926) (“As
[the President] is charged specifically to take care that [the laws] be faithfully executed, the
reasonable implication . . . must be, in the absence of any express limitation respecting removals,
that as his selection of administrative officers is essential to the execution of the laws by him, so
must be his power of removing those for whom he can not continue to be responsible.”).
12 See, e.g., Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992) (asserting that to allow Congress
to “convert the undifferentiated public interest in executive officers’ compliance with the law into
an ‘individual right’ vindicable in the courts is to permit Congress to transfer from the President to
the courts the Chief Executive’s most important constitutional duty, to ‘take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed’”); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 761 (1984) (“The Constitution, after all, assigns
to the Executive Branch, and not to the Judicial Branch, the duty to ‘take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed.’ We could not recognize respondents’ standing in this case without running afoul
of that structural principle.” (citation omitted) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3)).
13 See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (concluding that the Attorney
General and U.S. Attorneys have wide prosecutorial discretion “because they are designated by statute
as the President’s delegates to help him discharge his constitutional responsibility to ‘take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed’” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3)); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832
(1985) (“[A]n agency’s refusal to institute proceedings shares to some extent the characteristics of the
decision of a prosecutor in the Executive Branch not to indict—a decision which has long been regarded
as the special province of the Executive Branch, inasmuch as it is the Executive who is charged by the
Constitution to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.’” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3)).
14 See Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671, 686
(2014) (discussing the Obama Administration’s reliance on prosecutorial discretion to justify
categorical forbearance from prosecution under “federal marijuana laws,” “enforcement of [the
Affordable Care Act’s] statutory penalties for employers,” and enforcement of “removal statutes and
employment prohibitions against certain undocumented immigrants”).
15 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952) (“In the framework
of our Constitution, the President’s power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the
idea that he is to be a lawmaker.”).
16 See Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 613 (1838) (rejecting the
notion that “the obligation imposed on the President to see the laws faithfully executed, implies a
power to forbid their execution”).
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necessary to protect the operations of the federal government, even in cases in
which no statute provides explicit authority to do so.17
Two things stand out about the Court’s reliance on the Take Care Clause to
serve so many ends simultaneously. The first is that, in each of these contexts, the
Court treats the meaning of the clause as obvious when it is anything but that.
The Court’s decisions rely heavily on the Take Care Clause but almost never
interpret it, at least not in any conventional way. The Court does not typically
parse the text of the clause or try to situate it in the broader constitutional
structure that gives it context. Nor does the Court typically examine the clause’s
historical provenance (except to invoke an almost equally conclusory set of
interpretations by members of the First Congress in the Decision of 1789).18
The second striking element is that the functions that the Court ascribes to
the Take Care Clause are often in unacknowledged tension with one another. For
instance, deriving a strong prosecutorial discretion from the clause may collide
with the scruple against dispensation that the Court also reads into it.19 Similarly,
the Court has said that the Take Care Clause precludes presidential lawmaking
while also finding that the clause justifies the exercise of a presidential completion
power—an implied presidential authority to prescribe extrastatutory means
when necessary to execute a statute.20 The internal tensions, moreover, often give
rise to doctrines that ask for judgments of degree—line drawing that does not
lend itself readily to judicially manageable standards.
A brief Article is no place to try to fill all the interpretive and analytical
gaps in the Court’s Take Care Clause jurisprudence or to wade into the rich
debates that have engaged legal scholars, if not the Court. Instead, the Article
brings together various doctrines in order to show that the Court uses the Take
Care Clause as a placeholder for more abstract and generalized reasoning about
the appropriate role of the President in a system of separation of powers. It also
sketches lines of inquiry that the Court might pursue if it were ever to approach
the Take Care Clause seriously on the clause’s own terms.
Part I describes five of the Court’s structural doctrines that rely on the Take
Care Clause. In order to draw attention to the Court’s methodological approach
17 See Cunningham v. Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 67-68 (1890) (recognizing the President’s inherent authority
to provide a bodyguard to protect a federal judge despite the lack of any explicit statutory authority).
18 See generally Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 111-15 (1926); see also infra text accompanying note 167.
19 This past Term, in granting certiorari to review other questions arising out of a challenge by
several states to the Obama Administration’s program of Deferred Action for Parents of Americans
and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA), the Court propounded a question about whether the
prosecutorial guidance issued by the Secretary of Homeland Security concerning certain classes of
undocumented immigrants violated the Take Care Clause. See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134
(5th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 906 (2016). The Court, however, had no occasion to resolve
the Take Care Clause question because it affirmed the lower court’s judgment by an equally divided
Court. See United States v. Texas, 136 S.Ct. 2271 (2106); see also infra text accompanying note 176.
20 See infra Section I.E.
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to the clause, it emphasizes the tools the Court does or does not bring to bear on
construing the clause. Part II shows the high level of generality at which the
Court reads the clause. If the Court wishes to use the clause as more than a
marker for freestanding separation-of-powers analysis, this Article suggests
several question’s the Court must resolve about the clause’s import.
I. THE CASE LAW
A. The Removal Power
The Court has repeatedly relied on the Take Care Clause to justify the
idea that the President must retain at least some control over those who
execute the laws, notwithstanding a statute limiting presidential authority
over the law’s administrators. Though the Court had adverted to the idea
before,21 Chief Justice Taft’s opinion for the Court in Myers v. United States
gave the fullest account of the notion that the presidential duty to oversee
faithful execution of the laws implied a presidential power to remove those
who executed them.22 At issue was a statute that prohibited the President
from removing a postmaster first class without first securing the advice and
consent of the Senate. President Wilson had fired Myers, the postmaster in
Portland, without the requisite Senate approval, and Myers sued for
backpay.23 The government defended on the ground that the President had a
constitutional right to remove Myers without the Senate’s approval.24
In a seventy-one page opinion for six members of the Court, Chief Justice
Taft found illimitable presidential authority to remove an executive officer, at
least one who was appointed by the President by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate. His holding rested, in part, on the conclusion that the
Vesting Clause of Article II25 assigned the President the same “executive”
removal authority that the common law had invested in the Crown and that
the Articles of Confederation had given the old Congress.26 The Court also
invoked a course of governmental practice that stretched from 1789 until the

21 See Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 311, 317 (1903) (“In making removals from office it must
be assumed that the President acts with reference to his constitutional duty to take care that the laws
are faithfully executed, and we think it would be a mistaken view to hold that the mere specification in
the statute of some causes for removal thereby excluded the right of the President to remove for any
other reason which he, acting with a due sense of his official responsibility, should think sufficient.”).
22 272 U.S. 52, 106-178 (1926).
23 Id. at 106.
24 Id. at 108.
25 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the
United States . . . .”).
26 Myers, 272 U.S. at 110, 118.
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enactment of the Tenure in Office Act during the struggle between President
Andrew Johnson and the Republican Congress during Reconstruction.27
The Court’s opinion also relied centrally on the Take Care Clause. Chief
Justice Taft invoked that clause to hammer home the implication that a
President charged with exercising all of the executive power must have the
means to control subordinates through whom he or she would necessarily act:
As [the President] is charged specifically to take care that [the laws] be faithfully
executed, the reasonable implication, even in the absence of express words, was
that as part of his executive power he should select those who were to act for him
under his direction in the execution of the laws. The further implication must be,
in the absence of any express limitation respecting removals, that as his selection
of administrative officers is essential to the execution of the laws by him, so must
be his power of removing those for whom he cannot continue to be responsible.28

Taft’s opinion buttressed this structural reading of Article II by noting
that the President can “fulfill the [take care] duty” only through subordinates
who “aid him in the performance of the great duties of his office and represent
him in a thousand acts to which it can hardly be supposed his personal
attention is called.”29 In matters of foreign relations, Chief Justice Taft
thought it obvious that, because “the discretion to be exercised is that of the
President in determining the national public interest . . . . his cabinet officers
must do his will” on pain of removal.30 But he saw no basis for distinguishing
between the President’s power to remove an officer who “discharges a political
duty of the President or exercises his discretion” and one who “engage[s] in
the discharge of their other normal duties.”31 By virtue of Article II’s
assignment of the executive power to the President alone, he or she might
“properly supervise and guide [officers’] construction of the statutes under
which they act in order to secure . . . unitary and uniform execution of the
laws.”32 And this meant that the President had to have the power to remove
officers that he or she found to be “negligent and inefficient.”33
To be sure, if a statute “specifically committed [a given set of decisions] to
the discretion of a particular officer” or established a “quasi-judicial . . .
executive tribunal[] whose decisions after hearing affect [the] interests of
individuals,” then Congress might properly foreclose the President from
27 Id. at 111-64 (discussing the history of executive power during the three-quarters of a century
after the Constitution’s adoption).
28 Id. at 117.
29 Id. at 133 (quoting Cunningham v. Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 63 (1890)).
30 Id. at 134.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 135.
33 Id.
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intervening in the decision of a particular case.34 Even then, however, the
President could remove such an officer after the fact “on the ground that the
discretion regularly entrusted to that officer by statute has not been on the
whole intelligently or wisely exercised.”35 Without the power to remove officers
at some point, Taft reasoned, the President “does not discharge his own
constitutional duty of seeing that the laws be faithfully executed.”36 In short,
reading a removal power into the grant of executive power was necessary to
enable the President to fulfill the take care obligation also found in Article II.
In well-known later cases that blessed independent administrative
agencies, the Court implicitly or explicitly backed away from Taft’s broad
view of the “take care” obligation. Less than a decade after Myers, the Court
in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States upheld restrictions on the President’s
authority to remove Federal Trade Commissioners.37 Declaring the classic
regulatory functions of administrative agencies to be quasi-legislative and
quasi-judicial rather than executive, the Court sustained the removal
restrictions without so much as mentioning the Take Care Clause.38 In Wiener
v. United States,39 which upheld restrictions on the President’s power to
remove members of the War Claims Commission, the Court made it explicit
that, contra Taft’s dicta, the Take Care Clause does not govern quasi-judicial
functions but applies only to purely executive ones.40
The Take Care Clause reclaimed its pivotal place when the Court decided
Morrison v. Olson,41 which upheld a “good cause” restriction on the President’s
power to remove independent counsels—special prosecutors appointed to
investigate certain kinds of criminal wrongdoing by high-level government and
party officials. Morrison started by rejecting Humphrey’s Executor’s distinction
between quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial functions, on the one hand, and
executive functions, on the other.42 As a recent case had made clear, any federal
official (other than an Article III judge) who interpreted the law to implement
a statutory mandate was performing an executive function.43 Hence, Morrison
pegged the validity of the removal restriction on the simple question of whether
it “interfere[d] with the President’s exercise of the ‘executive power’ and his
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

Id.
Id.
Id.
295 U.S. 602, 630-32 (1935).
Id. at 624.
357 U.S. 349 (1958).
See id. at 352 (noting that the Humphrey’s Executor Court “narrowly confined the scope of the
Myers decision”).
41 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
42 Id. at 689.
43 See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733 (1986) (“Interpreting a law enacted by Congress to
implement the legislative mandate is the very essence of ‘execution’ of the law.”).
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constitutionally appointed duty to ‘take care that the laws be faithfully
executed’ under Article II.”44
Despite the removal restriction in the independent counsel statute, the
Court concluded that the statutory scheme did not “impermissibly burden” the
President’s Article II powers.45 In an oddly constructed sentence, the Court
wrote, “[t]his is not a case in which the power to remove an executive official has
been completely stripped from the President, thus providing no means for the
President to ensure the ‘faithful execution’ of the laws.”46 Because the Attorney
General could fire an independent counsel for “good cause,” the President
“retain[ed] ample authority to assure that the counsel is competently performing
his or her statutory responsibilities in a manner that comports with the
provisions of the [independent counsel statute].”47 In addition, though the Court
would not specify fully what counts as “good cause,” it noted that the legislative
history made clear that the term at least covers “misconduct.”48 Hence, the Court
implied that the “take care” duty encompasses the duty to ensure competence,
observance of law, and prevention of misconduct.
Finally, in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board,49
the Court again relied on the Take Care Clause to identify a novel limit on “good
cause” removal—a prohibition against “two-tiered” good cause limitations. At
issue was the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB)—an
entity established by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to regulate the accounting industry
by exercising rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudication authority.50 Congress
placed the PCAOB under the supervision of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) but authorized the SEC to remove PCAOB members only
for carefully defined forms of “good cause.”51 This created a difficulty because the
Court assumed, based on party stipulations, that the President could remove
SEC Commissioners only for good cause.52 Whatever the validity of either
removal restriction standing alone, two tiers proved too much:
The President cannot “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed” if he cannot
oversee the faithfulness of the officers who execute them. Here the President
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51

Morrison, 487 U.S. at 690.
Id. at 692.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 100-452, at 37 (1987)).
561 U.S. 477 (2010).
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub L. No. 107-24, § 101, 116 Stat. 745, 750-53.
The Act provided that the SEC had “good cause” to remove a PCAOB member only if such
official “willfully violated” specified laws, “willfully abused” his or her authority, or failed to enforce
the law “without reasonable justification or excuse.” 15 U.S.C. § 7217(d)(3) (2012).
52 The Court assumed that the President could remove the SEC Commissioner only for
“inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 496 (quoting
Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 620 (1935)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2016]

The Protean Take Care Clause

1843

cannot remove an officer who enjoys more than one level of good-cause
protection, even if the President determines that the officer is neglecting his
duties or discharging them improperly. That judgment is instead committed to
another officer, who may or may not agree with the President’s determination,
and whom the President cannot remove simply because that officer disagrees with
him. This contravenes the President’s “constitutional obligation to ensure the
faithful execution of the laws.”53

In the Court’s view, if the SEC could remove PCAOB members at will, then
the SEC “would be fully responsible for what the Board does,” and “[t]he
President could . . . hold the Commission to account for its supervision of the
Board, to the same extent that he may hold the Commission to account for
everything else it does.”54 Since the SEC could only remove PCAOB members
for cause, the President could affect the PCAOB’s decisions only if he or she
could determine that the SEC “unreasonabl[y]” decided that it lacked good cause
to fire members of the PCAOB.55 Under that arrangement, the Court reasoned,
the President “can neither ensure that the laws are faithfully executed, nor be held
responsible for a Board member’s breach of faith.”56
53
54
55
56

Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 484 (quoting Morrison, 487 U.S. at 693).
Id. at 495-96.
Id. at 496.
Id. Starting from similar premises, the Court in Printz v. United States relied in part on the Take
Care Clause to reject congressional power to “commandeer” state officials to enforce federal law. 521
U.S. 898, 922 (1997). At issue was the validity of the Federal Brady Act, which required state law
enforcement officers to conduct background checks of gun purchasers in order to determine whether
the putative buyer’s receipt or possession of a firearm would be unlawful. Id. at 903 (citing 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(s)(2) (1994)). After finding that such a requirement impermissibly intrudes upon state
sovereignty, the Court further concluded that Congress’s attempt to impress state executive officials
into federal service violates “the separation and equilibration of powers between the three branches of
the Federal Government itself.” Printz, 521 U.S. at 922. In the Court’s words,
The Constitution does not leave to speculation who is to administer the laws enacted by
Congress; the President, it says, “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,”
Art. II, § 3, personally and through officers whom he appoints (save for such inferior
officers as Congress may authorize to be appointed by the “Courts of Law” or by “the
Heads of Departments” who are themselves Presidential appointees), Art. II, § 2. The
Brady Act effectively transfers this responsibility to thousands of [state executive
officers] in the 50 States, who are left to implement the program without meaningful
Presidential control (if indeed meaningful Presidential control is possible without the
power to appoint and remove). The insistence of the Framers upon unity in the Federal
Executive—to ensure both vigor and accountability—is well known. . . . That unity
would be shattered, and the power of the President would be subject to reduction, if
Congress could act as effectively without the President as with him, by simply requiring
state officers to execute its laws.
Printz, 521 U.S. at 922-23 (citations omitted). Accordingly, the Take Care Clause not only constrains
control over the execution of federal law within the federal government, but also the allocation of
executive responsibilities between federal and state governments.
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B. Standing Doctrine
The Court has repeatedly relied on the Take Care Clause to define the scope
of Article III standing to sue.57 Standing doctrine, of course, defines what
constitutes a “case” or “controversy” for Article III purposes.58 In recent years,
the Court has made clear that a plaintiff who wishes to invoke “[t]he judicial
Power of the United States”59 must assert a concrete factual injury,60 a chain of
causation that links the defendant’s action to the harm alleged,61 and a
reasonable probability that the relief sought will redress the harm alleged.62
These criteria, as the Court has acknowledged, are too impressionistic to
produce a predictable, formulaic body of judicial doctrine.63 Instead, the Court
treats standing doctrine as a rough metric for capturing the proper role of the
federal courts—something “more than an intuition but less than a rigorous and
explicit theory, about the constitutional and prudential limits to the powers of
an unelected, unrepresentative judiciary in our kind of government.”64
Defining the role of the federal courts has inevitably entailed efforts by
the Court to define the boundaries between the judiciary and the political
branches. In setting the line between the executive and the judiciary, the
Court has put the Take Care Clause front and center. In perhaps the first
prominent example of this—Allen v. Wright—the Court denied standing to
the parents of African-American schoolchildren who alleged that the Internal
Revenue Service had failed to enforce a federal policy denying a charitable
tax exemption to private schools that discriminated based on race in their
admissions.65 The plaintiffs’ children had not applied to the private schools
that engaged in the alleged discrimination.66 Rather, the children went to
57 See, e.g., Leah M. Litman, Taking Care of Federal Law, 101 VA. L. REV. 1289, 1297 (2015) (noting
cases in which the Court has held that a nonexecutive actor may not advance an “undifferentiated public
interest” in federal court because Article III “requires the President alone to execute federal law”).
58 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
59 Id. art. III, § 1, cl. 1.
60 See, e.g., Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983) (reiterating that to maintain Article
III standing, an asserted injury must be “real and immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical”
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99
(1979) (requiring that a plaintiff have suffered “actual or threatened injury” to satisfy Article III).
61 See, e.g., Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41 (1976) (limiting standing to
only those “injur[ies] that fairly can be traced to the challenged action of the defendant”).
62 See, e.g., id. at 45-46 (concluding that a complaint must demonstrate a “substantial likelihood
that victory in [the] suit” would remedy the injury alleged).
63 See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (“[S]tanding doctrine incorporates
concepts concededly not susceptible of precise definition.”); Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams.
United for the Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982) (“The concept of ‘Art. III
standing’ . . . cannot be reduced to a one-sentence or one-paragraph definition.”).
64 Allen, 468 U.S. at 750 (quoting Vander Jagt v. O’Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(Bork, J., concurring)).
65 Id. at 752-53.
66 Id. at 746.
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public schools in school districts that were under desegregation orders, and
the plaintiffs alleged that the IRS’s nonenforcement (1) demeaned them and
(2) impeded desegregation by making it cheaper for white children to go to
discriminatory private schools in the plaintiffs’ school districts.67 The
plaintiffs relied on the Internal Revenue Code, Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act, and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.68
The Court denied standing on the ground that the first claim of injury,
which it described as “stigmatic,” was too abstract and widely shared to satisfy
the requirement of concrete and individualized injury.69 On the second
allegation of injury, the Court found that the plaintiffs’ contention—that
withdrawal of the subsidy would materially affect either the policies of, or
attendance at, the private schools—was too speculative to satisfy Article III.70
Of importance here, the Court’s decision reflected a worry that recognizing
standing in this case “would pave the way generally for suits challenging, not
specifically identifiable Government violations of law, but the particular
programs agencies establish to carry out their legal obligations.”71 This
possibility, in turn, implicated the separation of powers, in general, and the
Take Care Clause, in particular. In the Court’s words:
[The] principle [that an agency must have latitude to structure its own affairs],
grounded as it is in the idea of separation of powers, counsels against recognizing
standing in a case brought, not to enforce specific legal obligations whose violation
works a direct harm, but to seek a restructuring of the apparatus established by the
Executive Branch to fulfill its legal duties. The Constitution, after all, assigns to the
Executive Branch, and not to the Judicial Branch, the duty to “take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed.” We could not recognize respondents’ standing in this
case without running afoul of that structural principle.72

Hence, the Court’s strict reading of injury and causation requirements was
meant to filter out cases in which a plaintiff sought to vindicate the rule of
law rather than adjudicate a concrete dispute whose resolution would remedy
a particularized harm to him- or herself.73
In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,74 the Court went a step farther by
suggesting that the Take Care Clause constrains Congress’s authority to create
67
68

Id. at 752-53.
Id. at 745 n.12 (citing U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1982); 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981, 2000d (1982)).
69 Id. at 755-56.
70 Id. at 756-61.
71 Id. at 759.
72 Id. at 761.
73 Id. at 761 & n.26.
74 504 U.S. 555 (1992).

1846

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 164: 1835

rights of action to be vindicated in federal courts. At issue was whether the
plaintiffs—two individual members of the Defenders of Wildlife—had
standing to challenge an Interior Department regulation stating that federal
funding restrictions embodied in the Endangered Species Act (ESA)75 do not
apply to federally funded overseas projects.76 To support their claims of
injury, the individual plaintiffs filed affidavits stating that they had previously
visited two overseas sites to see endangered species (the Nile crocodile and
the Asian elephant), that they intended to return to those venues someday to
see those animals, and that federally funded projects in those areas threatened
the species the plaintiffs intended to go back to see.77
The Court in Lujan held that the plaintiffs lacked standing.78 In the
Court’s view, the plaintiffs’ stated intention to return to the sites in question
was too speculative and remote: “Such ‘some day’ intentions—without any
description of concrete plans, or indeed even any specification of when the
some day will be—do not support a finding of the ‘actual or imminent’ injury
that our cases require.”79 It did not matter to the Court that Congress had
included in the ESA a broad “citizen suit” provision that authorized “any
person [to] commence a civil suit on his own behalf . . . to enjoin any person
. . . who is alleged to be in violation of any provision of this chapter.”80
Although the plaintiffs clearly fell within that authorization, the Court
thought it unconstitutional for Congress to grant standing to those who did
not meet the minimum requisites identified in the Court’s standing cases.
Allowing such lawsuits to proceed, the Court said, would effectively sanction
a legislative intrusion upon the President’s Take Care responsibilities:
To permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated public interest in executive
officers’ compliance with the law into an “individual right” vindicable in the courts
is to permit Congress to transfer from the President to the courts the Chief
Executive’s most important constitutional duty, to “take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed,” Art. II, § 3. It would enable the courts, with the permission of
Congress, “to assume a position of authority over the governmental acts of another
and co-equal department,” and to become “‘virtually continuing monitors of the
wisdom and soundness of Executive action.’”81

75
76
77
78
79
80
81

See generally 16 U.S.C. § 1531–1544.
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 557-58.
Id. at 562-64.
Id. at 578.
Id. at 564.
Id. at 571-72 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2012)).
Id. at 577 (quoting Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 489 (1923); and Allen v. Wright,
468 U.S. 737, 760 (1984)).

2016]

The Protean Take Care Clause

1847

To be sure, the Court has since made clear that its “standing
jurisprudence” ultimately “derives from Article III and not Article II.”82 But
the Court’s decisions nonetheless use standing doctrine to patrol a perceived
constitutional boundary between the executive and the judiciary. By the
Court’s lights, those who seek to use the judiciary not to resolve some genuine
dispute over some concrete interest, but rather to enforce the legality of
government action, intrude upon what the Court regards as exclusive
presidential authority to assure government officials’ fidelity to law. That
separation-of-powers principle, which constrains both Congress and the
courts, comes straight from the Take Care Clause.
C. Prosecutorial Discretion
The Court has invoked the Take Care Clause to justify finding that the
President enjoys broad prosecutorial discretion. In Heckler v. Chaney,83
prisoners who had been sentenced to capital punishment filed suit challenging
the use of certain drugs for lethal injections on the ground that such use violated
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).84 The Court held,
however, that the judicial review provisions of the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA)85 preclude review of decisions by the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) not to bring enforcement actions to stop use of the drugs at issue.86 In
so holding, the Court reasoned that the discretion implicit in decisions not to
enforce a statute lay beyond the power of courts to review under the APA:
[A]n agency decision not to enforce often involves a complicated balancing of a
number of factors which are peculiarly within its expertise. Thus, the agency must
not only assess whether a violation has occurred, but whether agency resources are
best spent on this violation or another, whether the agency is likely to succeed if it
acts, whether the particular enforcement action requested best fits the agency’s
overall policies, and, indeed, whether the agency has enough resources to undertake
the action at all. An agency generally cannot act against each technical violation of
the statute it is charged with enforcing. The agency is far better equipped than the
courts to deal with the many variables involved in the proper ordering of its
priorities. Similar concerns animate the principles of administrative law that courts

82 Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 778 n.8 (2000)
(quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102 n.4 (1998)).
83 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
84 21 U.S.C. § 301 – 399f (1982).
85 In relevant part, the APA authorizes judicial review of final agency action “except to the
extent that—(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency
discretion by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2012).
86 Heckler, 470 U.S. at 831.
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generally will defer to an agency’s construction of the statute it is charged with
implementing, and to the procedures it adopts for implementing that statute.87

This discretion, the Court reasoned, made the FDA’s nonenforcement
decision analogous to a prosecutor’s decision not to indict—an exercise of
discretion protected by the Take Care Clause.88 As the Court put it:
[A]n agency’s refusal to institute proceedings shares to some extent the
characteristics of the decision of a prosecutor in the Executive Branch not to
indict—a decision which has long been regarded as the special province of the
Executive Branch, inasmuch as it is the Executive who is charged by the
Constitution to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”89

Although the Court was technically construing the APA, its understanding
of prosecutorial discretion under the Take Care Clause informed its reading
of that open-ended statute.
To similar effect was United States v. Armstrong,90 in which the Court
rejected a request for discovery to support a claim of discriminatory and
selective prosecution. To justify its relatively high threshold for discovery, the
Court emphasized that such a claim asks a court “to exercise judicial power
over a ‘special province’ of the Executive.”91 “The Attorney General and
United States Attorneys,” the Court explained, “retain ‘broad discretion’ to
enforce the Nation’s criminal laws.”92 These federal prosecutors “have this
latitude because they are designated by statute as the President’s delegates to
help him discharge his constitutional responsibility to ‘take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed.’”93 Accordingly, to protect that constitutionally
conferred discretion, the Court would apply a presumption of prosecutorial
regularity unless there was “clear evidence to the contrary.”94
D. Legislative Supremacy and the Antidispensation Principle
The Supreme Court has also invoked the Take Care Clause as the textual
source of the President’s duty to abide by and enforce the laws enacted by
Congress—that is, as the instantiation of the President’s duty to respect
legislative supremacy and not to act contra legem. The most famous
expression of this idea came in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, also
87
88
89
90
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92
93
94

Id. at 831-32.
Id. at 832.
Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3).
517 U.S. 456 (1996).
Id. at 464 (quoting Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832).
Id. (quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985)).
Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3).
Id. (quoting United States v. Chem. Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926)).
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known as the Steel Seizure Case.95 In the midst of the Korean Conflict, the
Steelworkers called a nationwide strike over a dispute with management
concerning working conditions.96 After various efforts to resolve the
conflict sputtered, President Truman issued an executive order directing the
Secretary of Commerce to seize the nation’s steel mills and to keep the
output of steel flowing.97 The order contained findings that seizure of the
mills was necessary to continue prosecuting the war effort.98 Although two
defense-related statutes authorized the President to seize property in
certain circumstances,99 the government argued that the conditions for
invoking such authority had not been met here and stressed that the
statutory seizure process, at least under one such statute, was “much too
cumbersome, involved, and time-consuming for the crisis which was at
hand.”100 The President, however, defended his action based on his inherent
powers under Article II’s Vesting Clause,101 the Commander-in-Chief
Power,102 and (you guessed it) the Take Care Clause.103
After rejecting the government’s contention that the Commander-in-Chief
power could justify such an assertion of presidential authority outside the
theater of war, the Court relied on the Take Care Clause to reject the Truman
Administration’s other claims of inherent constitutional authority:
Nor can the seizure order be sustained because of the several constitutional
provisions that grant executive power to the President. In the framework of our
Constitution, the President’s power to see that the laws are faithfully executed
refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker. The Constitution limits his functions
in the lawmaking process to the recommending of laws he thinks wise and the
vetoing of laws he thinks bad . . . .
The President’s order does not direct that a congressional policy be executed
in a manner prescribed by Congress—it directs that a presidential policy be
executed in a manner prescribed by the President.104

Separate opinions by members of the Youngstown majority expressed a like
sentiment about the Take Care Clause—that it obliges the President to respect
95
96
97
98
99

343 U.S. 579 (1952).
Id. at 583.
Id.
Id. at 589-95 (reproducing Exec. Order No. 10,340, 17 Fed. Reg. 3139, 3140 (Apr. 10, 1952)).
Id. at 586 n.2 (citing The Selective Service Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 759, 62 Stat. 604, 625627 codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 468 (1952 & Supp. IV); The Defense Production Act of 1950, tit.
II, Pub. L. No. 774, 64 Stat. 798 codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2081 (1952)).
100 Id. at 586.
101 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
102 Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
103 Id. art. II, § 3.
104 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587-88.
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the means and ends of statutory policy power specified by Congress. In his
famous concurrence, Justice Jackson wrote that the clause confers on the
President “a governmental authority that reaches so far as there is law,” thereby
“signify[ing] . . . that ours is a government of laws, not of men, and that we
submit ourselves to rulers only if under rules.”105 To similar effect, Justice
Frankfurter quoted Justice Holmes for the proposition that “[t]he duty of the
President to see that the laws be executed is a duty that does not go beyond the
laws or require him to achieve more than Congress sees fit to leave within his
power.”106 Likewise, in Justice Douglas’s words, any authority conferred by the
clause “starts and ends with the laws Congress has enacted.”107 These opinions
rejected the broader view, reflected in Chief Justice Vinson’s dissent, that a
“practical construction” of the Take Care Clause gave the President broad
flexibility to prescribe appropriate “mode[s] of execution” for the “mass of
legislation” on the books—authority that, according to Vinson, authorized the
President to seize the steel mills to ensure the fulfillment of statutes
appropriating money for the procurement of war materiel.108
Almost a century before Youngstown, the Court had also treated the Take Care
Clause as an expression of another important principle of legislative supremacy—
namely, that the President has no dispensation power. At common law, the
Crown had long claimed the prerogative to dispense with or suspend Acts of
Parliament when equity so required.109 By the Glorious Revolution, English law
had ceased to recognize such authority.110 In Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes,
the Court read the Take Care Clause as embodying this anti-dispensation
principle in the Constitution.111 At issue was a petition for mandamus filed to
compel the Postmaster General, Amos Kendall, to pay the full amount that
Congress had appropriated by private bill for the sum claimed to be due on a
contract that Stokes and others had made with the Post Office.112 In holding that
105
106

Id. at 646 (Jackson, J., concurring).
Id. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 177
(1926) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
107 Id. at 633 (Douglas, J., concurring).
108 Id. at 702 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting).
109 See, e.g., W.B. GWYN, THE MEANING OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 30 (1965)
(describing the king’s “royal power to dispense with the law to prevent violations of the higher law
of equity”); Robert J. Reinstein, The Limits of Executive Power, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 259, 278-79 (2009)
(explaining the Crown’s power to both suspend the operation of statutes and grant to individuals
the dispensation of not having to be bound by certain laws).
110 See Gordon S. Wood, The Origins of Vested Rights in the Early Republic, 85 VA. L. REV. 1421,
1425 (1999) (noting that in the Glorious Revolution, the English Bill of Rights “declared illegal
certain actions of the crown, including its dispensing with laws”); see also GWYN, supra note 109, at
30 (noting that the king’s dispensation power was no longer recognized by the end of the seventeenth
century).
111 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838).
112 Id. at 527-31.
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mandamus was available to compel Kendall to pay the full amount specified in
the Act of Congress, the Court considered and rejected the argument that
the postmaster general was alone subject to the direction and control of the
President, with respect to the execution of the duty imposed upon him by
this law, and [that] this right of the President . . . [grew] out of the obligation
imposed upon him by the constitution, to take care that the laws be faithfully
executed.113

Indeed, the Court concluded just the opposite:
This is a doctrine that cannot receive the sanction of this court. It would be
vesting in the President a dispensing power, which has no countenance for its
support in any part of the constitution; and is asserting a principle, which, if
carried out in its results, to all cases falling within it, would be clothing the
President with a power entirely to control the legislation of congress, and
paralyze the administration of justice.
To contend that the obligation imposed on the President to see the laws
faithfully executed, implies a power to forbid their execution, is a novel construction
of the constitution, and entirely inadmissible.114

In short, the Court has read the Take Care Clause to limit the President’s authority
to act contra legem.
E. Presidential “Completion Power”
In a previous work, we described what we call the President’s “completion
power”—implied executive authority, in the absence of an express statutory
grant, to take “incidental” measures that may be necessary to effectuate
statutory commands.115 In at least one well-known decision, In re Neagle, the
Court relied directly on the Take Care Clause to justify the President’s
exercise of the completion power.116 In Neagle, a deputy U.S. Marshal, David
Neagle, was indicted for murder after shooting an assailant who seemingly
posed an imminent threat to Justice Field, whom Neagle had been assigned
to protect.117 At issue in Neagle’s subsequent habeas petition was whether
Neagle was authorized to protect Justice Field, despite the lack of any statutory
authorization to serve as a bodyguard to a Justice riding circuit, as Justice

113
114
115

Id. at 612-13.
Id. at 613.
Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The President’s Completion Power, 115 YALE L.J. 2280,
2302-03 (2006).
116 135 U.S. 1, 63-64 (1890).
117 Id. at 5.
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Field was doing when attacked.118 Invoking the Take Care Clause, the Court
found ample implied authority for the Attorney General to assign deputy
marshal Neagle to the task:
The legislative branch of the government can only protect the judicial
officers by the enactment of laws for that purpose, and the argument we are
now combating assumes that no such law has been passed by Congress.
If we turn to the executive department of the government, we find a
very different condition of affairs. The Constitution, section 3, Article 2,
declares that the President “shall take care that the laws be faithfully
executed,” and he is provided with the means of fulfilling this obligation by
his authority to commission all the officers of the United States, and, by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint the most important of
them and to fill vacancies. . . . The duties which are thus imposed upon him
he is further enabled to perform by the recognition in the Constitution, and
the creation by acts of Congress, of executive departments, which have varied
in number from four or five to seven or eight, the heads of which are
familiarly called cabinet ministers. These aid him in the performance of the
great duties of his office, and represent him in a thousand acts to which it can
hardly be supposed his personal attention is called, and thus he is enabled to
fulfill the duty of his great department, expressed in the phrase that “he shall
take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”
Is this duty limited to the enforcement of acts of Congress or of treaties
of the United States according to their express terms, or does it include the
rights, duties, and obligations growing out of the Constitution itself, our
international relations, and all the protection implied by the nature of the
government under the Constitution?119

In the support of its reasoning, the Court offered other examples of the
executive’s exercise of what Professor Henry Monaghan has called “the
protective power” of the presidency.120 The Court, for example, cited an
incident in which the captain of a U.S. warship “train[ed] his guns upon [a
foreign] vessel” to secure the release of a foreign national, who had been
wrongfully held on that vessel despite having initiated the process to become
a naturalized U.S. citizen.121 The U.S. Secretary of State ultimately secured
the foreign national’s release and the actions of both the ship captain and the
Secretary of State were celebrated by Congress even though no statute authorized
118
119
120

Id. at 58.
Id. at 63-64.
See Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 61-63
(1993) (asserting that the Court has recognized, in decisions like Neagle, “an executive power to preserve,
protect, and defend the personnel, property, and instrumentalities of the national government”).
121 Neagle, 135 U.S. at 64.
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the government’s actions.122 In Neagle, the Court found that the same
inherent power made it plain that the executive could, in the absence of a
statute, “make an order for the protection of the mail and of the persons and
lives of its carriers.”123 And it could surely “place guards upon the public
territory to protect [federally owned] timber”124 or sue to “set aside a patent
which had been issued for a large body of valuable land, on the ground that
it was obtained from the government by fraud.”125 In light of these examples,
the President’s authority to ensure the faithful execution of the laws surely
provided authority for the executive, acting through the Attorney General, to
provide protection for a federal officer in the performance of official duties,
even in the absence of express statutory authority to do so.126
II. “TAKE CARE” QUESTIONS FOR THE COURT
The Court has used the Take Care Clause in numerous ways that are, in
many respects, in tension. In this Part, we show that the Court has done so
casually and at a high level of generality, without any attention to detailed
interpretive questions about the clause’s meaning or history. The Court has
also failed to recognize the degree to which its explication of Take Care Clause
doctrine in distinct and sometimes conflicting ways requires judgments of degree
and line drawing that defy judicially manageable standards.
A. (Non)interpretation of the Take Care Clause
The most striking feature of the Court’s Take Care Clause
jurisprudence is that the Court almost never construes the clause, at least
not in any conventional way. It does not look at any of the evidence one
would expect an interpreter to consider in determining the clause’s
relevance to the many uses to which the Court has put it. The Court has
never taken more than a glancing look at the text, its common law
meaning, the subsequent practical construction (“liquidation” of the
clause’s meaning), 127 the clause’s place in the broader constitutional
122
123
124

Id. at 64.
Id. at 65.
Id. at 65-66 (discussing Wells v. Nickles, 104 U.S. 444 (1881), in which the Court upheld the
authority of the Department of Interior to make rules and regulations to protect public land despite
the lack of any statutory authorization).
125 Id. at 66-67 (discussing United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U.S. 273 (1888), in which the
Court upheld the Attorney General’s right to bring suit to protect the federal government’s property
from fraud even though no act of Congress specifically authorized such a suit).
126 See Monaghan, supra note 120, at 62-63 (discussing the Neagle Court’s use of the Take Care
Clause to sustain the executive’s authority to provide protection for Justice Field).
127 See Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 525-27
(2003) (discussing the expectation among some prominent members of the founding generation that
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structure, or the political context from which it emerged. While it is not
possible here to exhume the extensive evidence of meaning, it is at least
worth noting some of the resources that the Court might have but did
not consider along the way.
1. Text and Structure
On one issue, the Court has made sense of the clause’s text and
structure in a rather sophisticated way. Although legal academics have
often stressed that constitutionmakers framed the clause as a duty rather
than a grant of power,128 a well-known—and commonsensical—canon of
textual interpretation instructs that the imposition of a duty necessarily
implies a grant of power sufficient to see the duty fulfilled.129 Time and
again, the Court has acknowledged just that. For example, in Myers,
Chief Justice Taft invoked James Madison for the proposition that
presidential removal power was necessary to enable the Chief Executive
to carry out “his duty expressly declared in the third section of the
Article to ‘take care that the laws be faithfully executed.’” 130 Similarly,
in upholding the President’s inherent authority to assign a U.S. marshal
to protect a circuit-riding Justice, the Court in Neagle stressed that if the
President could not task subordinates to “represent him in a thousand
acts to which it can hardly be supposed his personal attention is called,”

the meaning of ambiguous constitutional language would be settled through practical construction
by the branches charged with implementing it); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of
Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 910 (1985) (addressing the same phenomenon); see also Curtis
A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV.
411, 424-32 (2012) (considering the role of historical practice, more generally, in structural constitutional
adjudication).
128 See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary
Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1198 n.221 (1992) (describing Take Care Clause
text as “suggest[ing] an obligation of watchfulness, not a grant of power”); Mary M. Cheh, When
Congress Commands a Thing to Be Done: An Essay on Marbury v. Madison, Executive Inaction, and the
Duty of the Courts to Enforce the Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 253, 275 (2003) (explaining that the
language of the Take Care Clause “plainly indicate[s] that this clause is a duty imposed on the
president, not a source of power per se”).
129 See THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 77 (5th ed.
1883) (“It is . . . established as a general rule, that when a constitution gives a general power, or
enjoins a duty, it also gives, by implication, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the
one or the performance of the other.”).
130 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 117 (1926) (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 496-97 (1789)
(Joseph Gales ed., 1834)).
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it would be impossible “to fulfil the duty . . . that ‘he shall take care that
the laws be faithfully executed.’”131 And the list goes on. 132
At the same time, however, the Court has engaged in almost no close
analysis of the nature or scope of the duty that underlies the implied
power. The Court has yet to examine what the clause means by “Laws.”
Does the duty encompass only statutes or does it also reach the
Constitution, treaties, customary international law, and federal common
law? Put aside the question, largely unaddressed by the Court, of
whether the President may decline to enforce laws that he or she believes
to be unconstitutional.133 The scope of the Take Care duty might bear on
questions as common as whether an implied “completion power” extends
beyond the implementation of statutory commands to constitutional
ones. 134 It is also directly relevant to the question of whether the
President can violate customary international law or treaties. 135
Moreover, the Court’s standing decisions suggest that Article III limits
on judicial power are informed by the Take Care Clause and its apparent
grant of exclusive presidential power to enforce the rule of law (as such)
within the Executive Branch. 136 If Article II is more than window
dressing in the Court’s standing cases, then one would presumably need
to know whether the “Laws” within the President’s exclusive purview
reach beyond statutes.

131
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In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 64 (1890).
See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 483 (2010)
(recognizing “[t]he impossibility that one man should able to perform all the great business of the State”
entrusted to the President under the Take Care Clause (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting 30 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 334 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed.,
1939)); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 689-90 (1988) (grounding limits on Congress’s ability to
impose removal requirements in the President’s Take Care Clause obligations).
133 Cf. Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 906 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that the
President has “the power to veto encroaching laws, or even to disregard them when they are
unconstitutional”) (citation omitted).
134 The Court has addressed the point without analysis of the text or history of the clause. See
Neagle, 135 U.S. at 64 (“Is this duty limited to the enforcement of acts of Congress or of treaties of
the United States according to their express terms, or does it include the rights, duties and obligations
growing out of the Constitution itself, our international relations, and all the protection implied by
the nature of the government under the Constitution?”).
135 See, e.g., Louis Henkin, The President and International Law, AM. J. INT’L L. 930, 934 (1986)
(maintaining that the President’s Take Care obligations apply to treaties and principles of customary
international law); Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the President Bound by the Geneva Conventions?, 90
CORNELL L. REV. 97, 164 (2004) (arguing that constitutional text, history, and policy all support
the inference that the “Laws” encompassed by the Take Care Clause include treaties).
136 See supra Section I.B.
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Even if the Court has not written about this, legal scholarship has pored
over the question.137 To some law professors, “Laws” means only statutes.138
Why? Mostly, this conclusion reflects the fruits of what Akhil Amar would call
intratextualism—a close reading of one text in the context of surrounding
ones.139 The Take Care Clause refers to “Laws” simpliciter.140 But the
Supremacy Clause, inter alia, draws a clear distinction among (1) “[t]his
Constitution,” (2) “Laws . . . made in Pursuance thereof,” and (3) “Treaties.”141
Hence, to some, the contrast between the Take Care Clause and surrounding
provisions suggests that the former is limited to the enforcement of statutes.142
To others, that reading seems cramped. After all, the Constitution is
surely a “Law” of sorts,143 and the Supremacy Clause may in fact demarcate
statutory law from other “Laws” by specifying its applicability to “Laws made
in Pursuance []of [this Constitution].”144 In addition, reading “Laws” in the
Take Care Clause to refer only to statutes would create a structural oddity; it
would exhort the President to ensure faithful execution of statutes but not
the Constitution, even as Article II’s Oath Clause simultaneously requires the
137 The scholarship on the scope of the clause has largely focused on the question of whether
the President may decline to enforce a law that he or she regards as unconstitutional. See, e.g.,
CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, PRESIDENTIAL DEFIANCE OF “UNCONSTITUTIONAL” LAWS: REVIVING
THE ROYAL PREROGATIVE 16-17 (1998) (arguing that the Take Care Clause prohibits Presidents
from refusing to enforce statutes); David Barron, Constitutionalism in the Shadow of Doctrine: The
President’s Non-Enforcement Power, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter-Spring 2000, at 61, 64
(suggesting an analytical framework for Presidents to use to determine whether they may faithfully
decline to enforce a statute they consider unconstitutional); Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential
Review, 40 CASE WESTERN RES. L. REV. 905, 919-22 (1989) (discussing the views of Alexander
Hamilton, James Wilson, James Madison and Chief Justice John Marshall on the question); Peter
L. Strauss, The President and Choices Not to Enforce, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter-Spring
2000, at 107, 108-09 (arguing that “Laws” necessarily includes the Constitution). The question has
also arisen in connection with whether the President has a duty to defend in court a challenge to the
constitutionality of a law that he or she believes to be unconstitutional. See, e.g., Neal Devins &
Saikrishna Prakash, The Indefensible Duty to Defend, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 507, 532 (2012) (arguing
that the Take Care Clause does not require the President to enforce unconstitutional laws); Daniel
J. Meltzer, Executive Defense of Congressional Acts, 61 DUKE L.J. 1183, 1209 (2012) (discussing the
Executive Branch’s responsibility to defend statutes it deems unconstitutional).
138 E.g., MAY, supra note 137, at 17.
139 See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1999) (explaining
the technique of holistic textual interpretation in which a reader interprets a contested word or
phrase in light of another part of the Constitution using a similar word or phrase).
140 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
141 Id. art. VI, cl. 2. To similar effect, Article III prescribes jurisdiction over cases “arising under
[1] this Constitution, [2] the Laws of the United States, and [3] Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their authority.” Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
142 See, e.g., MAY, supra note 137, at 17.
143 E.g., Easterbrook, supra note 137, at 919 (citing Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Marbury
v. Madison for the proposition that the Constitution is law).
144 See Henry Paul Monaghan, Supremacy Clause Textualism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 731, 750
(2010) (explaining that the Supremacy Clause was intended to ensure that valid federal law would
prevail over contrary state law).
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President to “preserve, protect and defend the Constitution” to “the best of
[his or her] Ability.”145 The academic debate over the scope has grown extensive,
invoking a range of textual, structural, functional, and historical arguments.
It is not our aim, however, to wade into that debate. Rather, the important
point here is that in all the cases that have invoked the Take Care Clause, the
Supreme Court has never explicitly addressed the categories of “Laws” to
which the President’s duty extends.146
Perhaps more striking is the Court’s omission to address what the clause
means by saying that the laws must be “faithfully executed.” Dr. Johnson’s
dictionary—the leading one of the founding era—defines “faithfully” to mean
“strict adherence to duty and allegiance” and “[w]ithout failure of
performance; honestly; exactly.”147 Even if the clause reflects the ordinary
meaning of “faithfully” (that is, even if the clause does not adopt some kind
of term of art), it is hard to know what “faithful” execution entails. Surely,
the idea entails some duty of fidelity—some sort of allegiance and honesty.
But fidelity is a relational term. One shows fidelity or faithfulness to
something, and the clause does not say to what. The best bet is perhaps that
the clause exhorts the President to see that the law’s executors act with fidelity
to the laws they execute—that they adhere to the law. But the wording does
not perfectly fit even this most plausible interpretation, which would be
better captured by a clause that instructed the President to see that the laws
be “faithfully observed”—a formulation that makes “Laws” more obviously
the object to which fidelity is owed. And if one compares the Take Care
Clause with the Oath Clause—which prescribes an oath that the President
will “faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States”148—then
the Take Care Clause might be understood as an instruction to the President
to ensure that the laws are implemented honestly, effectively, and without

145 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8. Scholars who read the Take Care Clause in conjunction with
the Oath Clause argue that the Take Care Clause applies to the Constitution. See, e.g., Michael
Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J.
217, 261-62 (1994) (claiming that, when read together, the Take Care Clause and Presidential Oath
Clause impose a duty on the President to engage in independent constitutional review when carrying
out his or her duties); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Executive’s Duty to Disregard Unconstitutional
Laws, 96 GEO. L.J. 1613, 1632 (2008) (“[I]f we read the [Take Care] Clause as implicitly requiring
the President to execute unconstitutional laws, his execution of such laws would serve to breach the
Constitution and not preserve it.”).
146 For a catalog of the various ways in which the Constitution refers to “Laws,” see Edward
T. Swaine, Taking Care of Treaties, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 331, 342-43 n.64 (2008).
147 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London, J.F. & C.
Rivington et al. 6th ed. 1785). Webster’s first dictionary contained a similar definition, suggesting
that the President must act “[i]n a faithful manner; with good faith.” 1 NOAH WEBSTER, AMERICAN
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (New York, S. Converse 1828).
148 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
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failure of performance.149 On that view, both clauses, read in light of each other,
point toward a general obligation of good faith, as measured by the norms and
expectations that governed the proper exercise of executive power at the time.150
Again, it is not our purpose here to adjudicate what the Take Care Clause
means. What we find significant is that the Court has never parsed what
“faithfully” means or considered, in explicit terms, the baseline(s) against
which to measure fidelity. Consider the removal cases, in which the Court has
said that the President must have sufficient power to fire officials who are not
faithfully executing the law.151 In those cases, the permissibility of “good
cause” restrictions on removal should turn directly on what “faithful”
execution entails.152 If it requires the President to assure that subordinates
engage in honest, scrupulous, and good faith administration, the President
must have fairly broad removal powers that go beyond assuring that his or
her subordinates have acted lawfully.153 But if faithful execution merely means
adherence to law, then the removal power reserved to the President is more
focused on firing official lawbreakers. Even on that view, however, the Court
would need to say more than it has in order to determine what that duty
entails. If the President and a subordinate disagree about the meaning of a
statute about which reasonable people can differ, must the President have the
removal power in order to assure faithful execution of the law as he or she
sees it?154 Or is the Take Care Clause satisfied if the President can simply fire
a subordinate for violating the plain meaning of the statute or the
149 See Price, supra note 14, at 698 (arguing that because the Oath Clause does not say precisely
to what the President owes fidelity in the execution of his or her office, the clause’s “faithful[ness]”
requirement may simply connote a general executive duty to implement the law according “to notions
of justice, equity, and the public interest” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
150 See id. at 697-98 (noting that the Take Care Clause’s “qualified language—requiring the
President to ensure ‘faithful[]’ execution of the laws—invites inquiry into background normative
expectations about proper performance of the executive function” (alteration in original)).
151 See cases cited supra Section I.A.
152 See John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV.
1939, 2037 n.483 (2010) (discussing potential meanings of “‘faithful’ execution of the laws” and how
the term’s meaning affects the scope of the President’s removal power).
153 In upholding the “good cause” limitation on the President’s authority to remove the
independent counsels, the Court’s opinion in Morrison noted that the statutory restriction still left
the President ample room to remove such prosecutors for not “competently performing” the
responsibilities of his or her office in accordance with the governing statute and for “misconduct.”
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 692 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting H.R. Rep.
No. 100-452, at 37 (1987) (Conf. Rep.)).
154 It is now commonly accepted that there may be a “best” or “most natural” answer to a legal
question but that “reasonable” people may still disagree about what that answer is. See, e.g., Pauley
v. Bethenergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 702 (1991) (emphasizing that an agency’s interpretation
“need not be the best or most natural one by grammatical or other standards” as long as it is a
“reasonable” interpretation); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 845
(1984) (characterizing the question for a reviewing court as being “whether the Administrator’s view
. . . is a reasonable one”).
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unambiguous legislative intent?155 The scope of Congress’s discretion to
establish independent agencies depends centrally on which of these conceptions
best describes “faithful[] execut[ion]” of the laws, but the Court has never sought
to determine what that requirement demands.
2. Interpretive Canons
In one prominent area—Article III standing—the Court has invoked but
never discussed one of the most central canons of structural constitutional
law: “the exclusivity maxim.”156 That maxim, which sits among the larger
family of expressio unius or negative implication canons, instructs that when a
legal instrument grants a power and specifies the mode of its implementation,
interpreters should treat the specified mode as exclusive.157 This principle
underlies familiar cases that reject Congress’s efforts to prescribe legislative
procedures for making law outside of bicameralism and presentment,158
appointing federal officers other than through the Appointments Clause,159
or legislatively removing executive officers through means other than
impeachment and conviction.160 The maxim reflects the commonsense idea
that a lawmaker would not take pains to prescribe particular means of carrying
out a power if other methods would do.161

155 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 (“If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the
matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent
of Congress.”).
156 Manning, supra note 152, at 2006-07 (internal quotation marks omitted).
157 See, e.g., COOLEY, supra note 129 (explaining that “where the means for the exercise of a
granted power are given, no other or different means can be implied” (quoting Field v. People ex rel
McClernand, 3 Ill. (2 Scam.) 79, 83 (1839))).
158 See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 957-58 (1983) (determining that the one-house veto
was unconstitutional since such a procedure failed to “conform[] with the [Constitution’s] express
procedures . . . for legislative action,” namely bicameralism and presentment). See U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 7 for the Constitution’s bicameralism and presentment requirements.
159 See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 132 (1976) (per curiam) (finding that the unorthodox
method of appointing the Federal Elections Commission under the 1974 amendments to the Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971 violated the Appointments Clause because, “[u]nless their selection
is elsewhere provided for, all Officers of the United States are to be appointed in accordance with
the Clause”). The Appointments Clause of the Constitution specifies the President’s power to
appoint “Officers of the United States.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cls. 2.
160 See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986). The Constitution specifies a highly detailed
impeachment process. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (authorizing the House to exercise “sole Power
of Impeachment”); id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (assigning the Senate “the sole Power to try all Impeachments”);
id. art. II, § 4 (laying out the criteria for impeachment).
161 See Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method
in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1243 (1995) (reasoning that the expressio unius
canon provides an appropriate framework for construing “provisions of the Constitution that both
create entities and describe the powers those entities may wield”).
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Though the Court does not say so, its use of the Take Care Clause in its
standing cases162 turns on the applicability of this negative implication
maxim. The standing cases suggest that the President’s duty to ensure faithful
execution of the law connotes a corresponding power that is somehow
exclusive. Hence, Congress cannot establish legal rights of action that enlist
individuals as private attorneys general to police the legality of government
conduct. Unless the Court can satisfy itself that the plaintiff has suffered
some sufficiently concrete and personalized factual injury, then Congress is
simply inviting individuals to perform a legality-enforcing function that the
Constitution assigns to the President—and, apparently, the President alone.
The problem of course is that the expressio unius family of canons is a
notoriously slippery one.163 As the Court has emphasized in the statutory
context, whether to draw a negative inference from the specification of
something depends very much on the statement’s context.164 For example, the
Appointments Clause specifies a process that strikes a balance giving the
President initiative as nominator and the Senate the power to check that
presidential initiative through advice and consent.165 On that view, Congress’s
relieving the President of the contemplated check or imposing additional
checks upon the President’s authority would seem to upset this balance. The
clause’s elaborate procedures operate as both a ceiling and a floor on the
President’s appointments power.
It is not clear that congressional authorization of citizen suits disrupts a
similar balance under the Take Care Clause. Even if the Court has properly
read the Take Care Clause as creating an implied presidential power to
exercise whatever powers are needed to fulfill the duty imposed, the clause
nonetheless does assign a duty. And it is not hard to imagine imposing a
nonexclusive legality-enforcing duty upon the President. The drafters may
have insisted that the President ensure the legality or good faith of executive
officers while not precluding Congress from specifying other means of
policing executive legality. In other words, the President’s duty to ensure
legality could logically have been a floor above which Congress could venture
by creating private rights of action against federal officers or agencies. To
162
163

See cases cited supra Section I.B.
See Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 455
(1989) (explaining that a textual specification may reflect purposes other than implied exclusion of
things left unspecified).
164 See, e.g., Barnhart v. Peabody Coal, 537 U.S. 149, 168 (2003) (explaining that the expressio
unius canon applies only when the context suggests that “that items not mentioned were excluded
by deliberate choice, not inadvertence” (citing United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 65 (2002)));
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 81 (2002) (making a similar point about using the
canon in context).
165 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.

2016]

The Protean Take Care Clause

1861

conclude that the Take Care Clause was not just a floor establishing a
presidential duty but also a ceiling limiting congressional power, one would
need to advance historical or functional arguments that would suggest a
constitutional design to make the President’s duty exclusive. The Court’s
cases have never tried to make such a showing.166
3. History and Constitutional Meaning
The Court’s perfunctory approach to the Take Care Clause generally
extends to the clause’s history as well. Chief Justice Taft’s Myers opinion says
more about the clause’s history than any other we have found, but even Taft
only scratched the surface. Myers made passing references to what Madison
and others said about the Take Care Clause during the famous Decision of
1789—the removal power debate that arose around the First Congress’s
establishment of the Department of Foreign Affairs.167 Taft’s opinion also
cited President Cleveland’s invocation of the clause in a statement urging the
Senate to restore the removal power to him.168 The Court in Myers, however,
did not begin to grapple with Justice McReynolds’s telling historical
assertion, in dissent, that the New York Constitution—upon which much of
Article II was modeled—contained its own Take Care Clause but did not give
the Governor authority to appoint all executive officials or to remove them.169
Interestingly, neither the opinions that read the Take Care Clause as a
source of legislative supremacy nor those that treat it, conversely, as a source
of prosecutorial discretion, have looked at constitutional history. As discussed
below, the two impulses are potentially in tension if Presidents assert
166 Leah Litman argues that the principle of presidential exclusivity implicit in the standing
cases is inconsistent with areas of federal law which contemplate that other actors, including states,
may vindicate the public interest in implementing federal law. See Litman, supra note 57, at 1308-17.
167 See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 112, 117, 122-23 (1926).
168 Id. at 168-69. Taft also quoted Alexander Hamilton for the proposition that the enumeration
of specific presidential powers and duties, such as the Take Care Clause, does not detract from
Article II’s vesting of a more general “Executive Power” that includes presidential power to remove
subordinates. Id. at 137-39 (quoting 7 WORKS OF HAMILTON 80-81 (John C. Hamilton ed.,
Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1864)).
169 See id. at 236 (McReynolds, J., dissenting)

[The New York Constitution] then defined [the Governor’s] powers and duties—
among them, “to take care that the laws are faithfully executed to the best of his
ability.” It further provided, “that the Treasurer of this State shall be appointed by Act
of the Legislature;” and entrusted the appointment of civil and military officers to a
council. The Governor had no power to remove them, but apparently nobody thought
he would be unable to execute the laws through officers designated by another.
(quoting N.Y. CONST. §§ 9, 12 (amended 1821)).
For a similar argument, see, e.g., David M. Driesen, Toward a Duty-Based Theory of Executive Power,
78 FORDHAM L. REV. 71, 97-98 (2009).

1862

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 164: 1835

prosecutorial discretion to forbear from enforcing federal statutes in a categorical
way that, in effect, creates novel exceptions to otherwise unqualified statutory
commands.170 One way or the other, history may shed light on the question.
Some argue that U.S. constitutionmakers adopted the Take Care Clause with
an evident purpose to codify the anti-dispensation and anti-suspension
principles that emerged from the Glorious Revolution in England.171 Others,
however, see the historical record as more mixed. Professor Zachary Price, for
instance, notes that several state constitutions at the time of the founding had
adopted more explicit anti-prerogative clauses, that the Philadelphia
Convention rejected an anti-suspension clause, and that no one in the
constitutionmaking process explicitly equated the Take Care Clause with an
anti-prerogative impulse.172 And even if the clause was meant to preclude the
President’s exercise of dispensing or suspending authority, historical practice
might provide insight into what our legal system has viewed as a permissible
(perhaps inevitable) assertion of prosecutorial discretion rather than an exercise
of obsolete royal prerogative.173 Whatever the right answer to any of these
questions, what is telling is that the Court has essentially omitted to consider
evidence of the received understanding of the Take Care Clause, either at the
time of the clause’s adoption or as our political and legal system came to
clarify and settle its meaning over time.174

170
171

See infra text accompanying notes 176–77.
See, e.g., MAY, supra note 137, at 16 (reading the Take Care Clause, in historical context, as
reflecting a purpose to reject a variety of English royal prerogatives used “to evade the will of
Parliament”); Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration’s
Nonenforcement of the Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV.
781, 803-08 (2013) (drawing a similar conclusion). But see Saikrishna Prakash, The Essential Meaning
of Executive Power, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 701, 726 n.113 (disputing the claim that the clause serves as
the constitutional analogue to “English and state constitution prohibitions on dispensing and
suspending the laws”).
172 Price, supra note 14, at 692-94. Professor Price ultimately concludes, however, that the best
reading of the early evidence still cuts against presidential dispensing and suspending powers—a
conclusion that, in his view, is confirmed by an early circuit court decision and by the previously
discussed Kendall decision. See id. at 694-96 (discussing United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1192
(C.C.D.N.Y. 1806) (No. 16,342), and Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524
(1838)). See supra text accompanying notes 111–14 for a discussion of Kendall.
173 See Price, supra note 14, at 712-16 (discussing nineteenth- and early twentieth-century
executive and judicial precedents concerning the exercise of prosecutorial discretion); see also
Kathryn Preyer, Jurisdiction to Punish: Federal Authority, Federalism and the Common Law of Crimes in
the Early Republic, 4 L. & HIST. REV. 223, 238 (1986) (discussing the Jefferson Administration’s use
of prosecutorial discretion).
174 Similarly, in its standing cases, the Court has never suggested that anyone in the founding
generation understood the Take Care Clause as imposing an implied limit on Article III judicial
power. Nor has the Court invoked any subsequent course of practice treating the clause as a
constraint on Congress’s power to create previously unknown rights of action. The omissions here
may reflect the novelty of the Court’s reliance on the Take Care Clause as a source of standing
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B. Consistency and Line Drawing
We have already noted the tensions among the Court’s deployments of
the Take Care Clause. Some of these tensions highlight another key feature
of the Court’s Take Care cases. Almost all of the relevant cases turn on
questions of degree and thus require inscrutable line drawing between what is
permissible and impermissible under the Court’s understanding of the clause.
Consider the example of the relationship between prosecutorial discretion
and the scruple against executive dispensation or suspension of the law. Recall
that the Court has traced the President’s exercise of prosecutorial discretion
to the Take Care Clause.175 As noted, the Obama Administration has relied
on such discretion to justify its (1) forbearance from enforcing federal
marijuana possession laws in certain circumstances, (2) deferment of certain
regulatory requirements under the Affordable Care Act, and (3) adoption of
“deferred action” programs for classes of undocumented immigrants with
strong equitable claims to continued residence by virtue of specified personal
circumstances or ties to citizens or permanent residents.176 To some, such
exercises of power too closely resemble the royal prerogatives proscribed by
the Take Care Clause—those which the Crown invoked to suspend Acts of
Parliament or grant individuals dispensation from compliance with law when
equity so required.177
It is not our purpose to adjudicate in detail the merits of that question,
which like most constitutional questions, has arguments on both sides.178
Rather, what is significant here is that if the Court’s starting principles are
both correct—if the Take Care Clause justifies prosecutorial discretion but
also condemns executive dispensation or suspension—then there may be no
principled metric for identifying when a valid exercise of prosecutorial
discretion shades into an impermissible exercise of dispensation or suspension

doctrine—a proposition that did not find its way into the U.S. Reports until about three decades
ago. See supra Section I.B.
175 See supra Section I.C.
176 Price, supra note 14. As noted, after granting certiorari on whether one such deferred action
program (DAPA) violated the Take Care Clause, the Court left the issue unresolved when it affirmed
the decision below by an equally divided Court. See supra note 19.
177 See, e.g., Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 171, at 808, 835 (arguing that the Take Care Clause imposes
a duty on the President to enforce all valid congressional acts); Price, supra note 14, at 705 (arguing that the
executive impermissibly exercises obsolete royal prerogatives when prospectively licensing illegal conduct
or adopting a policy of nonenforcement towards entire categories of offenders).
178 See Jeffrey A. Love & Arpit K. Garg, Presidential Inaction and the Separation of Powers, 112
MICH. L. REV. 1195, 1216 (2014) (arguing that President Obama’s decision to defer enforcing certain
immigration laws is consistent with the requirements of Article II); Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia,
Response: In Defense of DACA, Deferred Action, and the DREAM Act, 91 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO
59, 62-64 (2013) (defending the Obama Administration’s exercise of prosecutorial discretion through
the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program (DACA)).
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power. Some prosecutorial discretion is inevitable;179 if the executive cannot
plausibly enforce the law against all who violate it, then enforcement agencies
must set prosecution priorities.180
While Professor Price has argued that announcing such priorities
categorically in advance may constitute a form of dispensation,181 it is not
entirely clear why the executive’s articulation of such limits makes the exercise
invalid. Imagine, for example, that the FDA has limited resources and
concludes that corn containing twenty ppm or less of aflatoxin poses a limited
risk of “adulteration” within the meaning of the FDCA.182 If the agency thinks
it unwise to devote scarce enforcement resources to such low-risk cases, why
would the further act of announcing that policy transform sound prosecutorial
discretion into unconstitutional dispensation?183 Perhaps there will be cases
in which the degree or character of the executive’s announced forbearance is
so great that it creates a sense of establishing an unauthorized exception to
an otherwise unqualified statutory prohibition—in effect, an executive
amendment of the statute at issue. But identifying the line between a
permissible exercise of prosecutorial discretion and an impermissible
dispensation of the law seems very much like a matter of degree, the limits of
which are subjective and difficult to define in a principled way.184
Such tensions and line-drawing problems recur in the Take Care Clause
case law because of the undefined nature of the duty or power at issue.
Youngstown tells us that the President has no inherent power to seize steel mills
in order to implement appropriations bills that call upon the President to
179 Kate Andrias has written that, given the broad delegations of regulatory power that mark
the modern administrative state, “presidential involvement in the enforcement of statutes involves
a considerable degree of law-shaping, if not lawmaking.” Kate Andrias, The President’s Enforcement
Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031, 1114-15 (2013).
180 See Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L.
REV. 653, 670 (1985) (acknowledging that “the executive has the power to set enforcement priorities
and to allocate resources to those problems that, in the judgment of the executive, seem most
severe”).
181 Price, supra note 14, at 705.
182 See 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(1) (2012) (defining “adulterated” food as that which “bears or contains
any poisonous or deleterious substance which may render it injurious to health” but not “if the
quantity of such substance in such food does not ordinarily render it injurious to health”).
183 Cf. Richard M. Thomas, Prosecutorial Discretion and Agency Self-Regulation: CNI v. Young
and the Aflatoxin Dance, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 131, 154-55 (1992) (discussing the virtues of allowing
agencies to announce prosecutorial policy in advance, such as curbing abuses of agency discretion
that can result from an unstructured approach).
184 In this sense, the problem bears a family resemblance to that of differentiating a permissible
statutory delegation of executive discretion from an impermissible statutory delegation of legislative
power. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474-75 (2001) (noting that “we have
‘almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy
judgment that can be left to those executing or applying the law’” (quoting Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting))).
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purchase the tools needed to prosecute an armed conflict.185 Even though the
President made a finding that the seizure of plants idled by strikes was essential
to ensure the procurement of the necessary weapons and ammunition,186 the
principle of legislative supremacy implicit in the Take Care Clause denied the
President authority to implement what the Court regarded as “a presidential
policy [to] be executed in a manner prescribed by the President.”187
In sharp contrast, recall that Neagle read the Take Care Clause to give the
President some degree of power to act, without prior statutory authority, to
protect “the rights, duties, and obligations growing out of the Constitution
itself, our international relations, and all the protection implied by the nature
of the government under the Constitution.”188 Indeed, in a complex world in
which Congress cannot foresee and provide for every implemental detail,
some implied “completion” power seems almost inevitable.189 Surely, if
Congress appropriated money for the President to purchase a warship, the
President could rightly claim inherent power to carry that command into
execution by entering into procurement contracts, even if Congress did not
enact a statute authorizing the President to do so. Where the line falls
between the President’s permissible exercise of a completion power and
impermissible exercise of legislative power reserved to Congress seems
difficult, if not impossible, to define in the abstract.190
Finally, the Court’s standing cases also present a difficult line-drawing
problem—though, in this instance, not one caused by a tension in the Take
Care Clause cases. As noted, if Congress authorizes someone without a
concrete and immediate injury in fact to bring a federal lawsuit challenging
agency action, the Court regards the resultant action as an intrusion on the
President’s apparently exclusive authority to ensure faithful execution of the
laws.191 In this vein, the Court has consistently made clear that an abstract
185
186
187
188
189
190

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587-89 (1952).
Exec. Order No. 10,340, 17 Fed. Reg. 3139 (Apr. 10, 1952).
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 588.
In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 64 (1890).
See Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 115, at 2305.
In the period between his presidency and chief justiceship, Taft offered a formulation of
presidential power that includes a completion power:
[T]he President can exercise no power which cannot be fairly and reasonably traced
to some specific grant of power or justly implied and included within such express grant as
proper and necessary to its exercise. Such specific grant must be either in the Federal
Constitution or in an act of Congress passed in pursuance thereof.
WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, OUR CHIEF MAGISTRATE AND HIS POWERS 139-40 (1916) (emphasis
added). As Henry Monaghan has written, however, Taft’s formulation “marks—but does not define—
a boundary between what can fairly be described as presidential discretion in implementing legislation
and unauthorized presidential law-making.” Monaghan, supra note 120, at 40.
191 See supra notes 74–81 and accompanying text; see also supra text accompanying note 162.
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interest in the “proper application of the Constitution and laws” cannot
sustain Article III standing.192
Even accepting the validity of that position, no principled metric exists
for determining just how concrete an injury must be before the Court will
treat it as proper Article III business rather than an intrusion upon the legalityenforcing function that the Take Care Clause assigns to the President.193 Recall
that in Lujan, the Court invalidated a citizen’s suit under the Endangered
Species Act because the plaintiffs did not have concrete enough plans to see
the endangered species whose habitats would allegedly be affected by a
violation of the Act.194 The Court, in effect, would not permit standing
because the plaintiffs had not purchased plane tickets to visit the affected
sites. However, as Cass Sunstein has asked, “[i]f a court [confronted with a
Lujan action] could set aside executive action at the behest of plaintiffs with
a plane ticket, why does the Take Care Clause forbid it from doing so at the
behest of plaintiffs without a ticket?”195 In the absence of a firm line identifying
where Article III power begins and the Take Care Clause obligation ends, the
Court’s standing doctrine blurs at the margins.196
In short, perhaps because of internal tension within the doctrine, or
perhaps because of the inherently imprecise nature of the Take Care Clause
obligation, line-drawing problems are endemic to the Court’s Take Care
Clause cases. Hence, identifying what the clause permits—and what it
forbids—will necessarily turn upon uncertain judgment calls about which
reasonable people can presumably differ. The Court, however, has not
acknowledged these internal tensions nor, for the most part, grappled with
the implications of the interpretive and doctrinal uncertainty that the clause
has generated in the Court’s own hands.

192 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-74 (1992).
193 See Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III,
91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 226-28 (1992) (discussing the uncertainties surrounding courts’ application
of the injury-in-fact requirement); see also Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L. REV. 227,

264 (1990) (“The factors relevant to the case determination exist on a continuum, and the Court
must unavoidably make choices about where on the continuum a line should be drawn. . . . The
Court must make distinctions of degree, not of kind.”).
194 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562-64.
195 Sunstein, supra note 193, at 213; see also Jonathan R. Siegel, A Theory of Justiciability, 86 TEX.
L. REV. 73, 100–01 (2007) (making a similar point).
196 The Court has suggested as much. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984)
(describing standing as “an idea, which is more than an intuition but less than a rigorous and explicit
theory” (quoting Vander Jagt v. O’Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1178–79 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Bork, J.,
concurring))); Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for the Separation of Church &
State, 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982) (“We need not mince words when we say that the concept of ‘Art.
III standing’ has not been defined with complete consistency in all of the various cases decided by
this Court . . . .”).
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CONCLUSION
The Take Care Clause is both particular and delphic. It imposes a specific
duty on the President but says very little about what that duty entails. The
Court, however, has treated the clause as having firm and definite content.
The Take Care Clause underwrites the President’s removal power, draws a
line between judicial and executive power, offers a source for the President’s
exercise of prosecutorial discretion, establishes legislative supremacy, and
gives the President a measure of completion power. With rare exceptions, the
Court has identified these diverse functions without any effort to ground its
decisions in a careful reading of the text, structure, or history of the clause.
Nor has the Court sought to reconcile its various Take Care Clause doctrines
with one another or troubled itself about its own capacity to resolve the
intractable line-drawing problems that its doctrine has created. Instead, the
Take Care Clause has been a placeholder for broad judicial judgments about
the appropriate relations among the branches in our constitutional system—
like the Court’s own Key Number for freestanding separation-of-powers
principles.
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